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This study provides empirical data which will
demonstrate the effects of leadership style on aircraft
material readiness. To facilitate the examination of
relationships, a broad definition of readiness was sought
which would incorporate variables collected in the MIC
reporting system into descriptive factors. Factor analysis
provided five factors: Aircraft Availability, Flight
Operations, Manpower Utilization, Mission Capability, and
Maintenance Procedures. Leadership style data were collected
by means of Fleishman's Leadership Opinion Questionnaire(LOQ)
,
and Fiedler's Least Preferred Co-worker Questionnaire (LPC)
.
The results of this study indicate that leadership
style is a significant predictor of aircraft material readiness
No single combination of leadership styles appeared to
improve aircraft material readiness, however, tradeoffs for
improving individual factors were observed. The tradeoff
for high Flight Operations appeared to be reduced Aircraft
Availability. The tradeoff for more efficient Manpower
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1. INTRODUCTION
Sea power comprises all those elements that
enable a nation to project its militar>^ strength
seaward and to project and maintain it beyond
the seas.
Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral USN., 1960
In times of peace, sea power is a difficult national
attribute to maintain and measure. It reflects more than
maintaining a specified level and force mix of ships and
aircraft in the inventory. The inventory must be able to
demonstrate a satisfactory immediate mobilization readiness.
Readiness, in turn, is a difficult term to define and
measure. Readiness encompasses every facet of military
strength and can be broken down into operational, material,
personnel, equipment, and combat readiness as well as
integrated from unit to fleet readiness.
Operational readiness is the generally accepted term under
which the various facets, such as material and personnel, are
collected and measured for each unit, command, and fleet.
In naval aviation, measurement of operational readiness
culminates with an Operational Readiness Exercise, (ORE), in
which each unit demonstrates to inspectors its ability to
meet whatever demands may be placed upon it. However,
operational readiness should not and is not measured by a
week long exercise alone. Detailed records are kept which
track a squadron through all phases of its training cycle,
as well as its preparation and subsequent deployment.

Demonstrating and maintaining a high degree o£ operational
readiness is an immensely important objective for naval
aviation squadrons as it becomes a major input in the selection
each year of the best squadron for each type aircraft as
recipient of the Battle Efficiency Award presented by each
Fleet Commander. Competition for this award is intense,
and attainment signifies a team effort that is unsurpassed
by all other squadrons.
Operational readiness in the context of the Battle
Efficiency Award is the ability of a squadron to demonstrate
sustained excellence in the performance of its mission. As
such, it is the summation of all the sub-components of
readiness; material, personnel, equipment, and combat
readiness. Many variables impact a squadron's level of
readiness through these sub-components -type of aircraft,
sophistication or configuration of the equipment, operating
environment, the number of flight hours on the aircraft, the
training and level of expertise of the maintenance personnel,
the amount of money available for repair and acquisition
of new equipment, the training of the pilots, and the
maintenance procedures employed with regard to scheduling
and use of test gear all have an effect on readiness.
One of the most important determinants of a squadron's
operational readiness is the material condition of the
aircraft. Maintenance of a high level of material readiness
allows the necessary training to ensue and enables successful
completion of the assigned mission.

Aircraft material readiness is the primary goal of one
department of a squadron; the Maintenance Department. Within
the Maintenance Department two key personnel are "in general
responsible for the overall productive effort and material
support of the department." The actions and reactions
of these key leaders, the Maintenance Control Officer (MCO)
and the Maintenance Chief Petty Officer (MCPO) , directly
affect the aircraft material readiness posture.
Although the MCO and MCPO make the daily decisions
regarding the scheduling and coordinationg of the main-
tenance department's workload, their actions are necessarily
determined in some measure by the policies of the Commanding
and Executive Officers. The emphasis that the CO and XO
place on such activities as training, military drills,
and flight profiles establishes the manner in which the
maintenance function is to proceed.
Every squadron contains these four key leaders and they
can be thought of as two dual leadership teams, CO and XO
,
MCO and MCPO. The CO and XO are responsible for the
efficient operation of the squadron as a whole. The MCO
and MCPO are specifically responsible for the efficient
operation of the maintenance, support and repair of
assigned aircraft.
The emphasis that each of these dual leadership teams
place on the activities necessary to achieve a consistently
high degree of operational and aircraft material readiness




thesis is to determine the correlations between the leader-
ship style of the dual leadership teams previously mentioned
and aircraft material readiness.
II . BACKGROUND
Naval Aviation has always emphasized adherence to sound
management policies and practices and sought to maintain a
high degree of readiness through innovative leadership.
Unfortunately, operational requirements, Naval Aviation's
"anywhere, anytime" attitude, and the tempo of carrier
operations make strict adherence to established guidelines
appear less desirable than completion of the present task
or dissolution of the current crisis. Management becomes
reactionary and leadership inconsistent all too frequently.
The pressure to depart from the exacting procedures,
easily adhered to under normal circumstances, varies directly
with the pressure associated with extraordinary requirements
and indiscriminant competitiveness. These outside pressures
are then translated to the organizational maintenance
personnel and result frequently in a trade-off of mission
performance for an increased sortie or hours flown rate.
Squadron operational and maintenance procedures can vary
considerably within the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program,
(NAMP)
,
guideline. Leadership through the chain of command
in each squadron determines the degree of adherence or
departure from the procedures outlined in the NAMP. A short-
sighted view of readiness without regard to all that it entails
11

can lead to seemingly appropriate actions within established
policies that degrade readiness in the long term or sacrifice
one type of readiness for another.
A. SQUADRON ORGANIZATION
One particular community in Naval Aviation has been
increasingly subjected to extraordinary demands and displayed
unusual competitiveness in the performance of its numerous
missions. The Light Attack community of Naval Aviation
has continually exhibited the capability to perform varying
missions outside the original intent for its aircraftjthe
A7E, Corsair II.
This phenomenon has been largely the result of the A7E
aircraft itself which has demonstrated an unusual capacity
to accept additional mission requirements with a minimum of
modifications. Leadership within the Light Attack wings of
both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets has been forced to
deal with the pressures inherent in Naval Aviation in a very
dramatic way.
The A7E aircraft is an all weather, single seat, attack
aircraft that performs a variety of missions including: bomber,
fighter, tanker, electronic counter-measures, and reconnaisance.
Each A7E squadron maintains approximately ten aircraft with
assignments varying dependent upon whether deployed afloat
or ashore.
The squadrons each have approximately 240 personnel assigned,
20-24 officers, and 220 enlisted. The Commanding Officer is
normally an 0-5 pay grade and serves a tour of from 30-36 months.

The first half of his tour with the squadron is spent as
the Executive Officer, (XO) , and the second half as the
Commanding Officer, (CO)
.
Each squadron is administratively separated into four
departments: Administration, Operations, Safety, and Maintenance
Within the maintenance department there are three permanently
assigned "ground" officers - a Limited Duty Officer (LDO)
,
normally assigned as the Maintenance Control Officer, (MCO)
,
a Warrant Officer, normally assigned as the Ordnance Officer,
and an Aviation Maintenance Duty Officer, (AMDO) , assigned
various billets. These "ground" officers are assigned to their
respective billets for a 36 month tour, subject to the wishes
of the CO.
The maintenance department represents the largest portion
of the assigned enlisted who perform the actual maintenance
and support of the aircraft. Their actions are directed by
the Maintenance Chief Petty Officer, (MCPO) , who is normally
assigned for a 36 month tour.
The specific duties of the four key individuals, or leaders,
are listed in two separate yet explicit instructions. Navy
Regulations establishes the duties of the CO and XO, while
the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program, (NAMP) ^ manual defines
the duties of the MCO and MCPO.
Under Navy Regs the CO and XO are responsible for the
efficient operation of the squadron as a whole. The CO is
further tasked with the responsibility for the safety, well-
being, and efficiency of his entire command. The XO is.
13

"primarily responsible, under the CO, for the organization,
performance of duty, and good order and discipline of the
entire command," [Navy Regs, 1974].
Although the duties of each member of this dual leadership
team are clearly delineated, in actual practice the dividing
line between duties of the CO and XO are not nearly so clear
cut. The CO establishes the duties of both assuming certain
responsibilities and hence implicitly determines the duties
of the XO by leaving the remainder to him.
Inherent in the task of efficient operation of the
squadron as a whole are two dichotomous functions that must
be performed by the CO, XO team; accomplishment of the task
and assurance of the safety and well-being of the entire
command. These functions can be performed by one, or both,
or divided between the members of the CO-XO leadership team.
The NAMP sets forth the duties of the MCO as "in general
responsible to the Maintenance Officer for the overall
productive effort and material support of the department."
Among the specific duties listed by the NAiMP for the MCO
are; coordinating/monitoring the department workload, establishing
procedures to effectively control the daily workload, assign-
ment of work priorities, and issuing maintenance instructions,
as required, to ensure adequate communication and control.
Although the NAMP does not specifically delineate the
duties of the Maintenance Chief Petty Officer, the MCPO as
head of the Maintenance Control Work Center assumes the
responsibilities of ensuring the function is properly carried
out. Among the duties listed by the NAiMP for the Maintenance
14

Control Work Center are; assign job control number and
priority for each maintenance action, maintain current
equipment status, assign work to appropriate work centers,
maintain cognizance of all uncompleted maintenance actions,
and take necessary action for reporting configuration,
material readiness, and flight data [OPNAVINST 4790. 6E].
As with the CO-XO dual leadership team, the MCO and
MCPO duties are not rigidly separated. Dependent upon the
policies of the CO, XO , or Maintenance Officer the duties
fo the MCO and MCPO may be clearly distinct and separate,
overlapping, or exactly the same in actual practice. Additionally,
the separation or lack of separation of responsibilities may
migrate to some natural division as a result of the styles
of the leaders.
On the surface it appears that the duties of the MCO-MCPO
dual leadership team are all task related duties. However,
included in the general responsibilities of coordinating/
monitoring the department workload and ensuring adequate
communication and control is the responsibility for the
safety and well-being of personnel assigned to the maintenance
department and this responsibility must be carried out in
accordance with the policies set forth by the CO, XO,. and
Maintenance Officer.
In summary, each squadron in the Light Attack Community
containstwo leadership teams with each team performing the
duties associated with the task related and socio-emotional
functions. The CO-XO team carries out these duties for the
15

squadron as whole, while the MCO-MCPO team perform^ their
duties within the maintenance department under the policies




The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program, (NAM?)
,.
manual
defines an aircraft as Operationally Ready, (OR), when that
aircraft is "safely flyable and capable of performing one
or more (but not necessarily all) of the primary missions
of the unit to which assigned." The aircraft must have
ready, mission essential subsystems necessary for the
performance of one or more of the primary missions. Primary
mission is defined as any basic mission(s) assigned by a
Military Service to the operational unit possessing the
aircraft [ OPNAVINST 4790. 6E].
When an aircraft is not capable of safely performing
a minimum of one of the primary missions of the unit to
which assigned it is defined as NOT Operationally Ready,
(NOR). There exist several reasons for a NOR status. These
include NOR aircraft status over which organizational
maintenance activity has some control; Not Operationally
Ready Maintenance, (NORM), NORM scheduled, NORM(S)
,.
and
NORM unscheduled, NORM (U) . NORM is an aircraft status
that indicates the aircraft is unavailable for, or incapable
of maintenance. This condition can be caused by a time
lag in retrieving the necessary support equipment, such as
a stand to reach the vertical stabilizer, the lack of
available maintenance personnel required for repair, or the
16

lack of available Quality Assurance inspectors necessary
to complete the maintenance action. An aircraft can also
be NOR due to a supply requirement over which the squadron
maintenance has no control.
Several of the situations arising which cause excessive
NORM time are contollable by the squadron. A squadron which
exhibits a high rate NORM should not necessarily be considered
to be less effective than a squadron which demonstrates a lower
rate, however, a consistently excessive rate of NORM aircraft
is undesirable and probably could be reduced by better
scheduling, improved training, and better anticipation.
Another statistic utilized to describe a squadron's ability
to perform assigned missions, in terms of aircraft readiness
is Full Systems Capable, (FSC) . To be FSC an aircraft must
be capable of performing all assigned missions. If an aircraft
is not in an FSC status, it is described as being in a
Reduced Material Condition, (RMC) . It should be noted that
although an aircraft may be RMC it may still be OR if it can
perform at least one primary mission safely.
Reasons for an aircraft to be RMC are, as with NOR, separated
into maintenance and supply. Supply, or RMCS , is generally
out of the control of the squadron. Similar to NORM(S) and
NORM(U)
,.
RMC can be further separated into Reduced Material





Excessive rates of RMCM, while not necessarily the fault
of squadron maintenance procedures or policies, generally can
be improved by such actions as increased emphasis and use of the
17

proper test equipment, strict adherence to repair or
prevention guidelines, such as corrosion control procedures,
and improved training, either formal or on-the-job, of
maintenance personnel.
Operationally Ready and Full Systems Capable are the
primary statistics for gauging the condition of the squadron's
aircraft. Aircraft Material Readiness, while necessarily
dependent on the condition of the aircraft, entails more than
just flyable and mission capable aircraft. The manner in
which the aircraft are utilized and the procedures for
repair are important parameters in addition to OR and FSC.
Squadron's whose primary emphasis is on amassing record
numbers of flight hours can only do so by maintaining a high
percentage of OR aircraft. One way to maintain a high OR
rate is to cut NORS time by utilizing one or two aircraft as
"parts birds" and flying the OR "birds" a disproportionate
amount of time. Aircraft reporting procedures prohibit the
indescriminate cannibalization of dov>/n aircraft to maintain
a high OR rate, however, consistently high cannibalization
rates indicate either the squadron's policy is toward
maintaining artificially high OR and FSC statistics, or a very
unusual situation.
Statistics which describe a squadron's performance of
requied maintenance deal with the man-hours expended and the
number of aircraft parts that were needlessly removed and
replaced.
A squadron that expends an inordinate amount of time on
required maintenance in proportion to the number of flight
18

hours during the period can be assumed to be experiencing
one of three situations:
(1) The required maintenance during the period
has been on particularly time consuming items.
(2) The work centers are over-cautious and send
excessive personnel to accomplish the tasks.
(3) The level of expertise of the maintenance
personnel performing the repair has been degraded
by improper training or inexperience, requiring
duplication of effort.
A reported statistic which indicates a general lack of
expertise or improper maintenance procedures is the "No Defect"
or "A799" rate. The A799 rate is the number of parts which
the organizational maintenance activity removed from the air-
craft, having diagnosed a failure, and inducted into the supporting
intermediate maintenance facility for which no failure, or
no defect existed. This condition indicates that either
the squadron maintenance personnel incorrectly diagnosed a
defect or correctly diagnosed a defect given improper use of
test equipment.
Aircraft Material Readiness for purposes of this study was not
simply considered to be the OR and FSC rates exhibited by the
squadrons, but, was also considered to be the readiness of
the aircraft with respect to the man-hours expended in repair
and the procedures employed to achieve OR and FSC.
19

Ill . REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A. DEVELOPMENT OF LEADERSHIP THEORIES
Leadership prior to the nineteenth century was left
chiefly to those fortunate enough to have been born into an
aristocratic family or those superior in intellect, physical
characteristics, or talent. With the social upheavals in
America and France more and more previously thought of as
common men began to affect their environment. Leaders emerged
from every walk of life and the study to identify leadership
qualities began.
1 . Great Man Theories
Early theorists of leadership explained the emergence
of superior men on the survival of the fittest and their
intermarriages which produced an aristocratic class biologically
different from the lower classes [Wiggam, 1931]. As times of
war and strife became more frequent in the early 1900's, leaders
began to emerge that were seemingly endowed with unique
qualities that captured the imagination of the masses. Dowd
maintained that "there is no such thing as leadership by the
masses. The individuals in every society possess different
degrees of intelligence, energy and moral force, and in
whatever direction the masses may be influenced to go, they
are always led by the superior few "[Dowd, 1936].
20

2 . Trait Theories
The most obvious traits which set apart one man
from another, regardless of position were personality and
character. These obvious traits were looked to to provide
that combination which enabled an individual to get others
to accomplish a given task.
Bernard defined a leader as "any person who is
more than ordinarily efficient in carrying psycho-social
stimuli to others and is thus effective in conditioning
collective responses." The abilities he identified as part
and parcel of leadership were sympathy, justice, and humanity,
insight, honesty and good faith, courage and patience [Bernard,
1926] .
Alternatives to the concept that a leader was
necessarily endowed with specific abilities were the
environmental theories.
3 . Environmental Theories
The environmental theorists proposed that the
emergence of a leader is a function of the time, place, and
circumstance. Under this concept a leader need not possess
a standard set of abilities which enable him to solve the
particular problems of the times.
Bogardus presented the idea that the leadership
a group will accept depends upon the nature of the problem
it must solve. [Bogardus, 1918]. Schneider observed that the
number of great military leaders in England was proportional





Some theorists of environemntal leadership went
even farther to explain leadership in terms of the situation.
Hook proposed that the greater the task, the greater the
need, the greater must be the ability of the problem-
solver. Who that problem- solver turned out to be was
irrelevant [Hook, 1943]
.
The extreme position adopted by Hook was of
course not supported in every case. There were certain
restrictions society placed on positions of leadership,
and certain limitations in positions that required a particular
skill. For instance, it was hard to imagine that a member of
the Nazi Party could be elected president of the United States,
or that a physically disabled aviator might possibly have been
pilot-in-command of a commerical air carrier in the time of
Hook's postulations . However, some credence was lent to
the environmental theories in that within a range of traits
or qualifications a wide variety of possible leaders could
emerge
.
The extreme positions of both the trait theorists
and environmental theorists led others to postulate that leader-
ship cannot be explained as the effect of the individual alone;
situational factors had to be accounted for.
4 . Personal - Situational Theories
Two early proponents of personal -situational
theories of leadership were Westburgh and Case.
Westburgh suggested that the study of leadership
must include the traits of the individual as well as the
specific conditions of the situation. [Westburgh, 1931].
22

Case identified three factors that produce leader-
ship: the personality traits of the leader, the nature of the
group, and the problem confronting the leader and the group
[Case, 1933] .
Research and theory somewhat lagged these early
suggestions. After World War II the earlier points of view
were expanded and studies of the variations of leader
behavior ensued.
Research on the behavior of leaders led to some
complicated results. Hemphill found that some types of
behavior are expected of leaders in all situations, and other
leader behaviors are more specific to particular types of
situations [Hemphill, 1950].
Stogdill's study of transferred executives indicated
that some of the behavior of the transferee in new situations
is characteristic of himself rather than the position [Stogdill,
1951 ].
These studies led to the conclusion that some
leader behavior was dependent more on the situation, while
other leader behavior was a function of individual difference.
Further, Sterling discovered that both leaders and followers
altered behaviors with different phases of the group process
[Sterling, 1950]. Leadership behavior was not found to be
a function of traits, of situation exclusively, nor was it
found to be static across the group process.
These results brought about a realignment in thinking
of the leadership process, and Shartle and Stogdill proposed
studying leadership in terms of the status, interactions,
23

perceptions, and behavior of individuals in relation to other
members of the organized group [Stogdill, 1955]
.
At this point in the development of leadership
theory all the variables that characterize modern theories had
been identified. Trait theorists identified leader qualities.
Environmental theorists identified situational demands.
Personal-Situational theories evolved into leader-group
interaction theories.
B. CONTEMPORARY POSITIONS
After the initial surge in leadership studies following
World War II, leadership theory shifted toward a broader frame
of reference. Methods and studies to include the variables
of leadership previously identified settled down into three
general schools of thought centered at three major
universities
.
The Ohio State University studies concentrated on des-
cription of the behaviors of leaders in formal organizations,
and sought to relate their leadership behavior to both
subjective and objective criteria of group satisfaction and
group performance.
The University of Michigan studies, on the other hand,
started with an initial focus on productivity and group morale,
with a view toward identifying supervisory behaviors that are
facilitative not only of productivity, but also of high morale
and satisfaction.
The studies initiated by Fiedler at the University of
Illinois concentrated on the personal need strucuture of the
leader and the interaction between him and the group, leading
24

toward group effectiveness. In most cases, these studies
were characterized by an attempt to use an objective, concrete
criterion of group productivity as a standard by which
to measure effectiveness of the leader [Jacobs, 1970].
1 . Ohio State Studies
At Ohio State the decision tp devote the majority of
attention to the development of concepts about leadership, and
to development of a methodology for studying leadership led
to identification of such variables for study as status, work
performance, personal interactions, responsibility, authority
and personal behavior patterns [Stogdill, 1957].
In studying the leader and his behavior, the focus on
the actions of the leader led to the paradigm for the study of
leadership developed by Stogdill which showed the organizational
influences on the leader's behavior. This orientation led
to the definition of a leader as an individual in a given office
or position of apparently high influence potential [Shartle, 1963]
Since the early work was done in formal organizations
it was quite natural that behavior, or leadership functions,
would separate into those functions that varied with the leader
and those that were constant with the position. Formal
organizations are goal-oriented and the definization of goals
and objectives led to structured functions for a given position.
The need to obtain descriptions of leader behavior that
might be classified into more general categories resulted in












Factor analysis of the responses to a questionnaire
developed from these categories and administered to many
organizational groups resulted in identification of the two
most improtant; Consideration and Structure [Halpin, 1957].
Consideration reflects the extent to which an in-
dividual is likely to have job relationships characterized by
mutual trust, respect for their ideas, consideration of their
feelings, and a certain warmth between himself and them. A
high score is indicative of a climate of good rapport and
two-way communication. A low score indicates the indivdual
is likely to be more impersonal in his relations with group
members
.
Structure reflects the extent to which an individual
is likely to define and structure his own role and those of
his subordinates toward goal attainment. A high score on this
dimension characterizes individuals who play a very active
role in directing group activities through planning, communicating
information, scheduling, criticizing, trying out new ideas,
and so forth. A low score characterizes individuals who are




The importance of consideration and initiating
structure as independent variables informal organizations is
reflected in the need for the leader to be flexible and to
balance his behavior to obtain the right balance of output
from his group. The effective leader has been described as the
leader who engages in both kinds of behavior, in the proper
amount, rather than avoiding one type or the other [Rim, 1965].
This idea led to the application of the two dimensions of
military leadership, called the Managerial Grid [Blake and
Mouton, 1965].
With the Managerial Grid a leader's behavior can be
scored in terms of his emphasis on mission performance and
his concern for his people. The Grid reflects the fact that
concern for people is not incompatible with a concern for
mission performance.
2 . University of Illinois Studies
The studies initiated by Fiedler at the University of
Illinois concentrated on the personal need structure of the
leader and the interaction between him and the group, leading
toward group effectiveness.
Group effectiveness in interacting groups, the primary
focus of the studies at the University of Illinois, was
postulated to be a result of the interaction between the leader
and the group. Assuming that both the leader and the group
possessed the requisite skills, resources, and abilities to
accomplish the task there appeared to be three major dimensions
which determined the degree to which the leader had influence
27

in his group; leader position-power, the structure of the
task, and the interpersonal relationships between leader and
members [Fiedler, 1967].
Allowing these dimensions to vary created different
degrees of situational favorablejness for the leader. Group
effectiveness then became a function of the leader's style
and the situational favorableness he faced.
Position power reflects the degree to which the
position itself enables the leader to get his group members
to comply with and accept his direction and leadership. This
power is construed to mean legitimate and reward-and-
punishment power similar to that described by French and
Raven [French, 1959]. Position power therefore is the potential
power which the organization provided for the leader's use
[ Fiedler, 1967] .
A leader who enjoys high position power is not
necessarily expected to get unprecedented performance from
his group, but it is certainly true that a leader with low
position power is at a disadvantage. The leader with low
position power must first convince the group to follow his
direction and be continually aware that his role as leader is
tenuous and highly dependent upon his personal relations with
individuals in his group.
Task structure is another important element of
situational favorableness for the leader. The task constitutes
the reason for establishing the group in the first place, in most
cases, and the group's existence depends on satisfactory per-
formance of the task. Groups which are subunits of a larger
28

organization are assigned a task and usually structure is
provided in the form of directives or constraints.
The nature of the task determines the leader's
influence to a considerable extent. The structured task,
is, in effect, one way of influencing member behavior by
means of the organizational sanctions which can be imposed,
and it reinforces position power. The leader of a group
which engages in a highly unstructured task cannot use
his own position power or the power of the organization
because the task dilutes his influence [Fiedler, 1967].
Interpersonal relations between the leader and the
group is largely determined by the personalities of the
leader and the group member, unlike position power and
task structure which are more determined by the organization.
Good interpersonal relations enables the leader to more
effectively direct the actions of the group, while, with
poor interpersonal relations, the leader may have to rely
on position power granted him by the organization.
Across the spectrum of situational favorableness one
other variable is hypothesized by Fiedler to be a determinant
of group effectiveness - leadership style. Leadership style
and leader behavior are two separate and distinct functions
in this theory. Leader behavior is the composite of the
particular acts engaged in by the leader to ensure task
accomplishment or strengthen leader-members relations
.
Leadership style is a function of the underlying
need structure of the leader. Although leadership style is
thought to be determined by personality, repeated efforts to
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correlate the two have failed [Fiedler, 1971].
Leadership style is measured by asking the leader to
describe his least preferred co-worker, (LPC) . If the
leader describes the LPC in negative and rejecting terms he is
presumed to place more importance on the task than on inter-
personal relationships. Conversely, if the leader describes
the LPC in accepting and favorable terms he is presumed to be
more relationship oriented.
Leadership style is thought to be a fairly constant
measure across all situations and is the chief determinant
of leader behavior although certain situations cause leaders
to behave seemingly inconsistently with their primary needs
[Sample and Wilson, 1965]. Fiedler explains this phenomenon
in terms of secondary needs [Fiedler, 1970].
Group effectiveness was the primary goal of the
University of Illinois studies. With leadership style a static
variable, Fiedler suggested matching situational favorableness
with the style of the leader. Position power, task structure,
and leader-member relations were the variables all under the
control, to a large extent, of the organization. Leader-
member relations was the variable not under direct control,
but could be varied by selecting the appropriate composition
for the leader.
C. REPRBSENTATIVE STUDIES
Regardless of the approach to the derminants of leadership,
the ultimate test of leadership is group effectiveness.
Unfortunately, group effectiveness measurement requires a lengthy
research and is hampered by turnover of personnel. Most
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research, therefore, has been conducted on leadership effective
ness, or more precisely, the effects of leadership upon the
group
.
1 . Consideration and Structure
The two most important dimensions of supervisory be-
havior identified by the Ohio State Leadership Studies were;
consideration and initiating structure. Two methods exist
for measuring a leader's behavior in terms of consideration
and initiating structure. The first method is to have the
leader describe the actions he feels he should take. The
second method is to have the group members describe the
behaviors actually exhibited.
Halpin found that the description, by leaders, of
how they ought to behave, "does not correspond closely" with
actual behavior as perceived by subordinates [Halpin, 1955].
Additionally, self -descriptions of consideration and structure
were not found to be significantly related to effectiveness
[Hemphill and Coons, 1957]. Description made by subordinates
in the study were positively related to ratings of unit
effectiveness
.
The leader's description of his attitude toward
consideration and structure can, however, be thought of as a
description of his leadership style and, as such, has some
effect on his behavior.
Studies which used the leader's self -description of
consideration and structure, while not extensive, have
yielded interesting results. Bass found, in a study for
predicting success in a large food-products corporation.
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that correlations after three years between performance
ratings and structure and consideration were .05 and
.32 respectively. In this study a man was rated high if,
"since he has taken over the job, his subordinates are showing
signs of doing a better job, getting more done, staying on the
job, exhibiting more satisfaction, and selling more." Per-
formance ratings were obtained once again five years after
the original administration and the consideration scale still
had a validity of .37. Ratings included strong emphasis on
the supervisor's ability to develop subordinate's performance,
growth, and satisfaction [Bass, 1958] .
In another study, Parker found that consideration was
strongly related to "favorable attitudes towards supervision"
(r=.51), to "group feelings of goal achievement" (r=.24), and
to the recognition that workers felt they received for good
performance (r=.45). Structure was significantly related to
favorable attitudes toward supervision (r=.22) and to pricing
errors (r=.23). Productivity did not correlate significantly
with either scale [Parker, 1963].
Perhaps the most strikingly successful study of the
leader's self -description and effectiveness was conducted by
Fleishman and Ko . In an large shoe manufacturing company 88
department managers described themselves in terms of consider-
ation and structure, and at the same time were individually
rated on overall proficiency by a management team The
correlation between self -description scores and management
team ratings was .50 for structure and .30 for consideration.
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When the managers were grouped into ranks, the correlation
with the proficiency ratings was .61 for structure and .43
for consideration [Fleishman and Ko 1962].
While many significant validities have been obtained
utilizing the self -description of the leaders with effectiveness
criteria, the pattern is not universal. It should be noted
however, that no cases were found where low consideration goes
with good performance. Thus, low consideration scores are
more Indicative of an undesirable situation. The results with
structure depend more on the situation.
In general, the pattern that emerges as most
undesirable for many situations is the one in which supervisors
are low in both consideration and structure. The high structure-
low consideration supervisor is more likely to show more turn-over,
grievances, and stress among his subordinates. There is also
evidence that managers high in consideration can be higher in
structure without these adverse effects [Fleishman and Harris,
1962]. For many criteria and situations, the above-average
structure and consideration pattern seems most likely to
optimize a variety of different effectiveness criteria [Fleishman,
1969] .
2 . Least Preferred Co-worker
The Contingency Theory of Leadership Effectiveness
establishes a spectrum of situational favorableness for the
leader based on three dimensions - leader posit i on power,
degree of task structure, and leader-member relations j the
most important situational favorableness dimension [Fiedler, 1971].
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In a study of B-29 bomber crews, two criterion were
used and leader-member relations were manipulated such that
the military commander was the sociometrically preferred
crew member and either endorsed or rejected the key man. When
the keyman was the radar observer or navigator and the leader
endorsed him, the task-oriented led teams scored higher on
radar bomb score circular error average. When the keyman was
rejected, the relationship oriented led teams scored higher.
[Fiedler, 1955].
Another study conducted on Anti-aircraft Artillery
crews varied leader-member relations by examining crews whose
leader was either the most-preferred crew member, or among
the ten least-preferred crew members. The criterion was the
location and acquisition of unidenitif ied aircraft. When the
leader was the most-preferred crew member, task-oriented led
teams out performed teams led by relationship oriented leaders.
When the leader was among the ten least-preferred crew members,
the relationship oriented leader's teams were more effective.
[Hutchins and Fiedler, I960].
The particular behavior of leaders, whether task or
relationship oriented, in the various situations is someivhat
explanatory of the phenomenon exhibited. Task oriented leaders
tend to be more effective in situations of high favorableness
or very poor favorableness , whereas relationship oriented
leaders tend to be more effective in situations of moderate
favorableness
. Table 3-1 presents the median correlations
between leader LPC and group performance in various octants




MEHIAN CORRELATIONS BETWEEN- LEADER LPC AND GROUP PERFORMANCE
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II GOOD STRUCTURED WEAK -.58 3
III GOOD UNSTRUCTURED STRONG -.33 . 12
IV GOOD UNSTRUCTUED WEAK ..47 10
;
V MOD. POOR STRUCTURED STRONG .42 6
VI MOD. POOR STRUCTURED WEAK
VII MOD. POOR UNSTRUCTURED STRONG .05 12





The majority of leadership theory and leadership
studies have been devoted to the concept of a single leader
in the group. In practice, however, many organizations, such
as the military, employ two leaders to perform the duties
required for group or unit effectiveness.
Whether the organization structures the task and the
positions to accomodate two leaders or allows the natural
evolution of the task to require dual leaders, organizations
under the Co-manager concept tend to divide the leadership
functions. One member acts as the task leader and the other
acts as the socio-emotional leader. Research by Bales indicates
that this is the most spontaneous and natural arrangement
to occur [Bales, 1958].
The task leader responds to the task-related demands placed
upon the organization such as unit effectiveness. Conversely,
the socio-emotional leader discharges the duties associated
with socio-emotional demands, such as maintaining subordinate
satisfaction. Frequently, task-related demands and socio-
emotioanl demands are incompatible and a compromise must be
reached.
The type of compromise that is effected depends in large
part upon the relative positions of the members of the dual
leadership team. In the military, for instance, the
commanding officer, (CO), is generally charged with responsibil-
ities of the socio-emotional leader but must also be concerned
36

with efficiency. The executive officer, (XO) , is generally
responsible for the task-related duties. The attitude of
the unit toward the task is established by the CO but
may be carried by the XO
.
In actual practice the military does not always divide
the responsibilities as described above. The XO is generally
forced to assume the role the CO delegates to him and may
not always be assumed to be the task-related leader.
A survey of naval officers conducted by Senger found
that in 60 percent of the commands the naval officers had
served in, the task and social functions were divided between
the CO and XO. Within this 60 percent, the CO assumed the
social role 37 percent of the time with the XO performing
the task role. In the remaining 23 percent, the roles
were reversed. In the 40 percent of the situations where
the functions were not divided, both the CO and XO assumed
the social role in 9 percent, and in 19 percent the CO
assumed both roles [Senger, 1971].
No single study was discovered that linked the Co-manager
concept of leadership with group effectivenss by comparing





Within the Naval Aviation Community, aircraft material
readiness is maintained at a high level by emphasizing
individual readiness parameters such as operationally ready
(OR) , and full systems capability (FSC) . Under conditions of
limited assets and long procurement pipeline times, maintenance
of OR and FSC at specified levels is frequently accomplished
by tradeoffs of manhours and established maintenance procedures.
An example of this condition is the commonly accepted
practice of removal of "black boxes" which are carried to
supply's rotable pool, exchanged without paperwork, and replaced
with new "black boxes" in order to make launch. Too often the
problem was not with the "black box" in the first place but with
the aircraft itself. In this type of situation assets are
wasted^ innumerable manhours are needlessly expended, and
testing of the entire system must still be accomplished. Adherence
to Naval Aviation Maintenance Program, NAMP
,
guidelines may or
may not prevent lost sorties in the short run, but certainly
would tend to minimize wasted assets and effort.
Policies and procedures under which naval aviation squadrons
operate emanate from two sources. First, published procedures,
guidelines, and directives outline the the manner in which
operations, both flight and maintenance, are to be conducted.
Second, the emphasis that squadrons place on the operations of
the unit and the maintenance effort establishes the degree of
adherence or departure from the directives.

The intent of this thesis is to demonstrate that the
emphasis that four key leaders in naval aviation squadrons
place on activities to maintain a high degree of aircraft
material readiness is a significant variable in the level of
readiness exhibited.
Additionally, the intent is to measure the relationship
between emphasis on the activities necessary for efficient
operations, represented as leadership style, and the level
of aircraft material readiness exhibited.
Finally, the intent of this thesis is to demonstrate that
by collating the individual readiness parameters currently
collected into descriptive factors, tradeoffs among factors





The sample in this study consisted of 24 squadrons whose
mission was to fly and maintain the A7E aircraft. Of these 24
squadrons, 19 provided data far this study.
No attempt was made to separate deployed from non-deployed
squadrons although several squadrons were deployed during the
period for which the readiness data was collected.
Leaders in the four key positions within each squadron were
required to have served in their respective billets during the
full six-month period for which readiness data for the unit was
collected.
No attempt was made to identify leader rank, age, experience,
level of education, behavior, or personality characteristics.
B. INSTRUMENTS
Leadership style for each of the leaders participating in
the survey was identified using Fleishman's Leadership Opinion
Questionnaire (LOQ) , and Fiedler's Least Preferred Co-worker
Scale (LPC)
.
The leaders were asked to describe how they felt they
ought to act on each of the situations described by the LOQ.
The LOQ provided measures of the leader's style on the two
dimensions of supervisory leadership identified by the Ohio
State Leadership Studies as meaningful in a wide variety of




The leaders were additionally asked to describe their
least preferred co-worker on the LPC. The LPC provided a
measure of the leader's underlying need- structure , which
Fiedler uses to describe a leader's style. From the LPC, a
leader was identified to be task-, independence-, or relation-
ship-oriented. If a leader described his least preferred
co-worker in very negative or rejecting terms he was identified
as task-oriented. If the leader could distinguish his least
preferred co-worker in rather more positive terms he was
identified as relationship-oriented. Those leaders who did
not distinguish their least preferred co-workers as either
all bad or possessing good qualities, in spite of the leader's
inability to work well with them, Fiedler has identified as
being independence-oriented.
C. CRITERIA
Sixteen separate readiness variables were collected for
each squadron over a six month period in which as many as
possible of the key leaders were attached to and discharging
their respective duties in the unit.
To better identify an overall description of the unit's
performance in aircraft material readiness, the readiness
variables were grouped by factor analysis into five descriptive
factors
.
Readiness can be categorized many ways to specifically
relate it to a particular condition or ability. However, in
order to examine the relationship between leadership style and
the parameters of readiness which might be affected by leadership
style a bridge was sought to relate the generally accepted
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variables of readiness within the aviation community with
composite indices o£ conditions or activities which are
easily identified as affected by leadership.
Accordingly aircraft material readiness for purposes
of this study was not considered to be simply material,
operational equipment, combat, personnel, or mobilization
readiness. Instead, aircraft material readiness was re-
defined to include descriptive factors from the areas of
equipment, operations, personnel, mission, and material
readiness
.
This was accomplish by means of factor analysis of the
variables listed in Appendix A. Since some of the variables
had extremely high correlations or were in fact identity
relationships, the variable list was condensed to those
linearly independent variables which were thought to have
a relationship with leadership style yet still were descriptive
of aircraft material readiness. Specifically, the variables
which were not considered in the factor analysis were: Total
percent NORS , Total percent NORM(U) , Total percent RiMCS,. and
Total percent RMCM(U) . Aircraft downtime due to supply and
unscheduled maintenance was considered to be generally unpre-
dictable or uncontrollable by the squadrons.
Factor analysis was performed on the remaining variable to
provide variable groupings and weights which would be indicative
of the facets of readiness. The analysis produced five factors
with factor loadings, or weights, for each of the twelve
readiness variables. To identify and label the five factors.
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it was necessary to consider only the major variables in
each factor. This was accomplished by limiting the variables
in each factor to those whose factor weight was greater than
.3 or less than -.3. The resultant factors were then labelled
according to the significant variables in each. TABLE 5-1.
Aircraft material readiness was determined to include
Aircraft Availability, or equipment readiness; Flight Operations,
or operational readiness; Manpower Utilization, or personnel
readiness; Mission Capability, or mission readiness; and
Maintenance Procedures. Altnough the last factor. Maintenance
Procedures, has not been specifically defined as a type of
readiness, it contributes significantly to each of the other
factors and, indeed, to each of the variables of readiness.
Factor scores were computed for each of the 24 squadrons.
For squadrons with missing data in the variables, the mean
of all other squadron data was substituted. Only three
variables were affected by missing data: RMCM, with only
two squadrons' data missing, CANN with only three squadrons'
data missing, and A799 with eight squadrons' data missing.
Ratios were used in calculating the readiness variables
to reduce the impact of deployments, varying numbers of
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FACTOR 4 MISSION CAPABILITY
EIGENVALUE =1.39 PCT of VAR =11.6
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.66548 X AVG A/C = HRS RRS
HRS PERIOD
-.61335 X RMCM = HRS RMCM (S ^ U)
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.38402 X NORM =HRS NORM (S 5 U)
HRS RRS





Statistical analysis of the instrument and criterion data
was accomplished with the aid of the Statistical Package For
the Social Sciences (SPSS).
Factors for aircraft material readiness were computed by
means of factor analysis. Factor analysis in this study
as was noted earlier was employed to explore and detect
patterning of the readiness variables with a view to new
insights on readiness concepts more descriptive of the broad
and general category of aircraft material readiness. Addition-
ally, the factor analysis method was utilized to gain a
reduction of data and construction of indices to be used as
new variables in analysis with the leadership data.
The three steps associated with the factor analysis were:
(1) preparation of the correlation matrix, (2) extraction of
the initial factors, and (3) rotation to a terminal solution.
In this study R factor analysis was performed based on
correlations between the variables of the readiness data.
The initial factors which were extracted became a new
set of variables computed on the basis of the inter-relationships
exhibited in the data. The new variables were defined as exact
mathematical transformations of the original data. This was
accomplished by principal-component analysis which transformed
the readiness variables into a new set of composite variables
that were uncorrelated (orthogonal) to each other.
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These principal components represented the best linear
combination of variables that would account for more of the
variance in the data as a whole than any other linear
combination of variables.
The first principal -component , therefore, was viewed as
the single best summary of linear relationships exhibited in
the data. The second component was defined as the second
best combination of variables, under the condition that the
second component was orthogonal to the first. The second
and succeeding components were therefore, defined as the
linear combinations of variables that accounted for the most
residual variance after the effect of the first component
was removed from the data.
The principal component model utilized was:
z. = a.,F. + a.-F^ + ... + a.„F„
3 Jll j22 jnn
where:
z-= variable j in standardized form
F.= uncorrelated components (factors)
a..= standardized multiple-regression coefficient of
•^
"^ j on factor i extraction
Following extraction of the initial factors, the matrix
constructed was rotated to an orthogonal terminal solution
matrix in which all factors were uncorrelated. In this type
of solution, the coefficients of the variables within each
factor represented both regression weights and correlation
coefficients. The higher the coefficient of a variable within
a factor the more important that variable was to the factor.
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These "most important" variables were then used to
label the factors.
Selection of the number of factors used to describe air-
craft material readiness was based on the cumulative
percentage of variance explained by the factors. The sum
of the percentage of variance explained by all of the
factors included in the terminal.'.solution had to be greater
than .8.
Relationships between leadership style and the criterion
variables, the computed factors, were tested by means of three
members of the closely related family of multi-variate
statistical techniques: bivariate correlation, and canonical
correlation, and multiple regression.
Bivariate correlation provides a measure of the extent of
the linear relationship between a single predictor and a single
criterion variable. Pearson's product-moment correlation
coefficients were computed for each possible combination of
leadership style and the variables of readiness, as well as for
the constructed factors. The product-moment correlation
coefficients measured the degree of linear association in the
combinations and each was then individually tested for
statistical significance.
Multiple regression analysis derives a linear relationship
between a single criterion variable and two or more predictor
variables. Multiple regression provides five values of
importance to the researcher. The first value, multiple R,
indicates the degree of correlation between the criterion
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variable and the linear combination of predictor variables.
The second value, B, indicates the appropriate coefficient
for each of the predictor variables in the linear
regression equation. The third value, S, has the same role
as B when all the measurements are standardized. Both B
and 3 are proportional to the correlation between the
criterion variable and each of the predictor variables, with
all other criterion variables partialled out (held constant)
.
The fourth value, C, is the intercept constant in the regression
equation for unstandardized measurements. The final value, F,
is a ratio which allows the statistical significance of the
multiple R and B or 6 values to be determined.
The multiple regression was performed stepwise where the
predictor variables were entered into the equation on the
basis of their partial correlation with the criterion variable.
In the first step the predictor variable with the highest
absolute value simple correlation coeficient was entered
from the list of independent, or predictor variables. The
values B, C,B , multiple R and F were computed to allow the
investigator to cut-off the regression or continue by
entering the next predictor variable.
Multiple regression was performed on the readiness
variables and factors for each dual leadership team separately
by introducing the leadership style variables into the
regression equations in a step-wise fashion. A general form
of the multiple regression model is specified by:

for L = 1 , 2 , . . .n
where
:
Y. = Value of the dependent (or criterion) variable for
the ith leadership team.
6j^ = Weightings for predictor variables.
e. = Random error term for the ith leadership team.
Canonical correlation, a statistical technique
similar in many respects to both multiple regression and factor
analysis, derives a linear combination for two sets of
variables in such a way as to maximize the correlation between
between the two linear combinations termed canonical variates
.
The square of the amount of correlation bet\veen each pair
of canonical variates is termed the eigenvalue. This value
represents the amount of variance in one canonical variate
which is accounted for by the other canonical variate. In
this study, CL, CT , CS , XL, XT, and XS taken two at a time
and varied to form all possible combinations represented one
set of input variables. ML, MT , MS, PL, PT, and PS were
combined in a manner similar to CL to XT and formed the other
set of input variables. The factors computed for each
squadron were grouped in the following manner: Factor 1, Factor
2; Factor 1, Factor 4; Factor 2, Factor 4; Factor 3, Factor 5.
These combinations of factors formed the criterion set of
input variables in the generalized formula:






~ Weighting for the nth factor variable (n=l,2).
6j^ = Weighting for the mth leadership-style variable
(m=l,2).
C = Criterion variable n (n=Factors 1-5) .
n
P = Predictor variable m tM=CL, CT, ...).
m
VI. RESULTS
The restrictions placed upon the sample at the outset
that the leaders must have served in their respective billets
for at least six months to be compared with the readiness
data for that period reduced the number of dual leadership
teams to nine cases of Commanding and Executive Officers and
nine cases of Maintenance Control and Maintenance Chief
Petty Officers.
A. LEADERSHIP STYLE
Mean scores for leaders in the sample were computed on
each of the leadership questionnaires. CS, CT , XS , XT, MS, MT
,
PS, and PT were computed from the leader's scores on the
Leadership Opinion Questionnaire (LOQ) , reflecting the
leaders' emphasis on the dimensions of supervisory behavior;
consideration and structure, (TABLE 6-1). These scores were
then compared with normative LOQ data, (TABLE 6-2).
The means obtained on the perceived roles of leaders
demonstrated that leadership teams of CO ' s and XO ' s placed
more emphasis on the social role than the task role. Conversely,
the MCO-MCPO leadership teams tended to place more emphasis on
the task role than on the social role.
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Within each team, the XO ' s as a group tended to place
more emphasis on the consideration dimension than did the
GO'S. Additionally, the XO ' s tended to place more emphasis
on the Structure dimension than did the CO's.
For the MCO-MCPO dual leadership teams, the MCO ' s placed
more emphasis on the consideration dimension, while the
MCPO's placed more emphasis on the structure dimensions.
Mean scores for the leaders on the Least Preferred Co-
worker Scale (LPC) are intended to reflect the underlying
need structures of the leaders. CL , XL, ML, and PL were
computed with CL (4.09), XL (3.92), ML (3.61), and PL (4.62).
These scores were compared with data obtained from ten year
survey conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School on LPC
scores for 601 military officer and Department of Defense
employees. The mean score obtained in the Naval Postgraduate
School study was 3.75. For this study, CO's and XO ' s were
found to be above the mean. iMCO ' s were found to be below
the mean, and MCPO's were found to be a substantial one
standard deviation above the mean.
In comparison of the LOQ results with the LPC results,
the CO-XO team demonstrated the following expected tendency:
the CO's were more relationship-oriented than task-oriented
as measured by the LPC, and placed more emphasis on consideration
than on structure, as measured by the LOQ. Like the CO's,
the XO ' s were more relationship oriented than task oriented,






LEADER n MEAN STD DEV.
CO LPC - CL 9 4.09 .89
CO COM - CS 9 54.11 6.15
CO STRU - CT 9 44.44 6.09
XO LPC - XL 9 3.92 .71
XO CON - XS 9 55.90 6.10
XO STRU - XT 9 47.33 9.57
MCO LCP - ML 9 3.61 .69
MCO CON - MS 9 53.78 7.40
MCO STRU - MT 9 48.22 6.04
MCPO LPC - PL 9 4.62 1.12
MCPO CON - PS 9 49.33 3.81


























































The MCO-MCPO teams, however, did not demonstrate an emphasis
on the socio-emotional or task-related dimensions of the
LOQ in consonance with their underlying need structures, as
measured by LPC. The MCO ' s were task oriented rather than
relationship oriented but, conversely, placed more emphasis
on considerations than on structure. The MCPO's were more
relationship oriented than task oriented as measured by the LPC,
yet placed more emphasis on structure than on consideration
as measured by the LOQ. This schizophrenic appearing result
may account for some of the later findings.
B. LEADERSHIP AND READINESS
Bivariate correlation, multiple regression, and canonical
correlation analyses were used to discover relationships between
leadership style and the computed factors of aircraft material
readiness
.
Bivariate correlation analysis provided five significant
correlations (p=.05), out of 60 possible, between the variables
of leadership style and the computed factors of readiness.
(TABLE 6-4). Aircraft Availability, factor 1, had significant
correlations with the CO's LPC (.77), and the CO ' s structure,
CT (-.70). Manpower Utilization, factor, 3, and a significant
negative correlation (-.65) with the MCO ' s LPC. Maintenance
Procedures, factor 5, had significant correlations with the CO's
consdieration score (.71) and the XO's structure (-.62). No
significant correlations were obtained for Flight Operations and
Mission Capability with the variables ofleadership style.
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Multiple regression of the factors of readiness and
leadership style producedonly three significant results out
of sixty analyses. (TABLE 6-5). Factorl, Aircraft Avail-
ability, was found to be significantly predicted by CT (-.76),
and XT (.46), with a multiple R of .84. This result indicates
that high Aircraft Availability would tend to be associated
with situations where the CO provides less structure and the XO
provides more structure.
Maintenance Procedures, factor 5, was found to be
significantly predicted by XT (-.55) and CT (-.55), with a
multiple R of .83. This result indicates that low
Maintenance Procedures tends to be associated with situations
where both the XO and CO are high in initiating structure.
Aircraft Availability, factor 1, was found to be significantly
predicted by CL (.77), and XL (.31) with a multiple R of
.83. This result inciates the more relationship oriented both
the CO and XO are, as measured by the LPC, the higher
Aircraft Availability tends to be.
No significant results were found for factor 2, Flight
Operations, factor 3, Manpower Utilization, or factor 4,
Mission Capability. Additionally, no significant results for
any factor were obtained for the MCO-MCPO dual leadership
teams with multiple regression.
Results with canonical correlation were obtained by
varying the readiness factors in groups of two with combinations
of leadership style for the dual-leadership teams. (TABLE 6-6).
The decreased sample size due to matching up of the leaders



































































































































































Variables Factor 1 CT XT
B weights and C -.32 .17 .. 6.23
Beta weights -.76 .46
F 11.51 4.21
Significance .01 -
Analysis Multiple R F DF Significance
2. .82620 5.38 2/5 .05
Variables Factor 1 CL XL














Variables AVG A/C CT CS XT
B weights and C -.091 .12 .077 5.72
Beta weights -.67 .88 .63










Variables AWM NORM CT CS XS XT
B weights and C -1.17 4.66 2.07 2.19 -379.85
.
Beta weights -.41 1.67 1.06 .87
F 15.20 32.90 27.4 115









Variables RMCM CT CS XS XT
B weights and C .17 -1.20 -1.397 -.53 161.21
Beta weights .27 -2.21 -2.33 -1.27
F 4.48 50.17 43.12 26.20









Variables FSC CT XT XS CS
B weights and C -2.27 -.72 -1.14 -1.97 357.00
Bets weights -.999 -.36 -.73 -.88
F 173.16 3.76 25.01 17.69




Analysis Multiple R F DF Significance
7. .95 16.27 3/5 .01
Variables U>n{ CS XT XS
B weights and C 2.19 1.55 .84
Beta weights 2.66 2.07 1 .46
F 48.00 36.83 30 .86
Significance .01 .01 .01
Analysis Multiple R F DF Significance
8. .94 18.74 2/5 .01
Variables CANN cr XT
B weights and C -.49 -.43 57.23
F 16.40 15.95
Significance .01 .01
Analysis Multiple R F DF Significance
9. .80 5.31 2/6 .05
Variables A799 PT MS
B weights and C .18 -.27 11.12
Beta weights .56 -.56
F 5.23 5.90
Significance .05 .05 *
Analysis Multiple R F DF Significance
10. .87 9.63 2/6 .05
Variables CL cr CS
B weights and C -.10 -8.14 13.16
Beta weights -.71 -.56
F 12.78 7.87
Significance .01 .05
Analysis Multiple R F DF Significance
11. .95 29.57 2/6 .01
Variables CL XS XT
B weights and C .082 .083 -4.43
Beta weights .81 .63
F 41.69 25.44
Significance .01 .01
Analysis Multiple R F DF Significance
12. .63 4.38 2/13 .05
Variables XL XS XT
B weights and C .055 ,023 2.51
Beta weights . .527 -.29
F 5.92 1.76
- Significance .05 -
Analysis Multiple R F DF Significance
13. .83 6.77 2/6 .05
Variables FACTOR 5 XT CT
B weights and C -.70 -.78 • 6.84
Beta weights -.55 -.55
F 5.85 5.83





Analysis Multiple R F DF Significance
14. .73 8.15 1/7 .05
Variables XT CS
























.92 12.04 4 .017
Scale 1 Scale 2 CT XT
-.94 .51 1.00 -.27
Cancorr D.F. Significance
.90 9.30 4 .05
Scale 1 Scale 2 CT XS
-.87 .62 1.01 .09
Cancorr D.F. Significance
.90 10.92 4
Scale 3 Scale 5 CS
.71 .69 1.21
Cancorr D.F.






.57 .81 1.13 .46
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equation at one time. The factors were separated into all
possible groups of two and input as criterion variables.
The combinations of leadership style formed the set of
predictor variables. Four significant results were obtained
from 60 analyses.
Aircraft Availability, factor 1, and Flight Operations
factor 2, when considered together, and a significant correlation
with the emphasis that the CO and XO place on initiating
structure behaviors. Eighty-five percent of the variance
in Aircraft Availability and Flight Operations was explained
when CT and XT were the predictor variables. This result
indicates that when the CO places more emphasis on initiating
structure, (S for CT was 1.00) and the Xo places less
emphasis on intiating structure behavior ( S for XT was -.27),
Flight Operations would tend to be high ( 6=.51), while
Aircraft Availability would tend to be low ( S=-.94).
Aircraft Availability, factor 1, and Flight Operations,
factor 2, when considered together, additionally had a
significant correlation with the emphasis that the CO places
on initiating structure and the emphasis that the XQ places
on consideration. Eighty-one percent of the variance in
Aircraft Availability and Flight Operations was explained
when CT and XS were the predictor variables. This result
indicates that when the CO places emphasis on initiating
structure ( B for CT was 1.01) and the XO places emphasis on
consideration ( S=.09), Flight Operations would tend to be
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higher re =.62) and Aircraft Availability would tend to be
low (6 =- .86) .
Manpower Utilization, factor 3, and Maintenance Procedures,
factor 5, when considered together, had a significant correlation
with the emphasis that the CO places on consideration and the
emphasis that the XO places on structure. Eighty-two percent
of the variance in Manpower Utilization and Maintenance
Procedures was explained when CS and XT were the predictor
variables. This result indicates that when the CO places
emphasis on consideration ( 6 for CS was 1.28) and the XO
places more emphasis on initiating structure (3= -.44),
Manpower Utilization would tend to be low ( 6 =-.71) but
Maintenance Procedures would tend to be high ( B=.69).
Manpower Utilization and Maintenance Procedures had an
additional significant correlation with the emphasis that the
CO and XO place on consideration as a desired behavior.
Ninety- two percent of the variance was explained in Manpower
Utilization and Maintenance Procedures when CS and XS were
the predictor variables. This result indicates that when
the CO places emphasis on consideration ( B for CS was 1.13) and
the XO places emphasis on consideration ( ^=.46), Manpower
Utilization (3 =.57) and Maintenance Procedures (3 =.81) would
tend to be high.
No significant results with canonical correlation were
obtained for the other combinations of leadership style for
the four leaders and the factors of aircraft material readiness.
In summary, several signigicant relationships were found
between aircraft material readiness, as defined in this study.
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and leadership style of the CO-XO dual leadership teams.
Bivariate correlation and multiple regression analysis
demonstrated that high aircraft material readiness can be
predicted by combinations of the leadership styles of these
two leaders. Canonical correlation analysis demostrated
that tradeoffs exist in the factors of aircraft material
readiness when the CO-XO team places emphasis on certain
behaviors over others. The tradeoffs were significant
and measureable.
Significant relationships existed between individual
factors of aircraft material readiness and the leader's
underlying need structures, as measured by the LPC, but in
only one case did the combination of need structures for two
leaders, the CO and the XO, significantly predict a factor
of aircraft material readiness, in this case, Aircraft
Availability.
No significant relationships between the leadership
style of the MCPO and the factors of aircraft material readiness
were found. Additionally, the combinations of leadership
style for the MCO-MCPO dual leadership team were not found to
be significant predictors of any factors of aircraft material
readiness
.
Mission Capability, factor 4, was not found to demonstrate
any significant relationships with either individual dimensions
of leadership style of combinations of leadership style for
either dual leadership team.
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Restrictions caused by reduced sample size in matching
leaders to six month summaries of readiness prohibited any
analysis of combinations of leadersip style between the
CO-XO and MCO-MCPO teams with the fact6rs.
Overall, the results indicated that there are significant





Aircraft Material Readiness is a very general term
which encompasses many facets of readiness, several of which
are outside the control of the squadrons. Readiness categories
such as supply and personnel readiness are in general not directly
[{
determined by actions that can be taken at the squadron level.
For this study aircraft material readiness was limited to
five factors: Aircraft Availability, Flight Operations, Man-
power Utilization, Mission Capability, and Maintenance Procedures.
It was hypothesized that combinations of leadership style within
two dual-leadership teams in the squadron, the Commanding
Officer-Executive Officer (CO-XO) team and the Maintenance
Control Officer -Maintenance Chief Petty Officer (xMCO-MCPO)
team, would have significant relationships with aircraft
material readiness through the computed factors.
Leadership style in the Light Attack community of Naval
Aviation did not follow any preordained patterns but did
significantly correlate with several facets of readiness.
There appears no definable pattern in the separation of
roles in the squadrons participating in this study. CO's do
not tend to be higher in the socio-emotional dimension than
XO's in general. The situation where the CO was higher in
the socio-emotional dimension, while the XO was higher in the
task-related dimension, appeared the largest number of times.
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However, the situation where the XO was higher than
the CO in both dimensions seemed to overshadow the results
appearing in 29% of the cases. The separation of roles for
this team appeared to be particular/ influenced by the CO's
underlying need structure.
This influence was evidencedby the number of significant
correlations obtained with the CO's LPC score. CO LPC appeared
to have relationships with the CO's structure, (-.67), the XO '
s
consideration (.72), CO's structure (-.70), and CO's consideration
(-.56) together, and the XO ' s consideration (.81) and
structure (.63) together.
Only one result appeared that would indicate that the
role that the CO takes may influence the role the XO assumes.
A significant relationship was found between the CO's
consideration and the XO ' s structure (-.81).
In addition to the relationships that the XO ' s task-related
and socio-emotional dimensions had with the CO, the XO ' s LPC
was found to have a significant relationship with the XO '
s
consideration (.53) and structure (-.29).
No significant relationships were found where either the
CO's or XO's leadership style correlated with the MCO and
MCPO's leadership style.
For the MCO-MCPO team, the dominant situation, 4 of 9 cases,
was for the social and task roles to be split with the MCO
assuming the socio-emotional role and the MCPO assuming the
task role, (MS-PT) . The second most prevalent situation, 3
of 9 cases, was for the MCO to assume the task related role
while the MCPO assumed the role as socio-emotional leader (MT-PS)
.

In summary, the leadership style deemed by the leaders
as appropriate for their positions did not appear to be
influenced by billet descriptions or traditional roles. The
underlying need structure for the CO did appear to have the
largest number of relationships with the roles that the
CO-XO team perceive they should assume; however, the XO '
s
underlying need structure additionally had a significant
relationship with the role he perceived he should assume.
Leadership style did, however, have several significant
correlations with readiness and the computed factors of
readiness
.
Five of the individual variables of readiness had
significant correlations with leadership style. FSC had
significant relationships with the CO's LPC (.75), the
GO'S structure (-.84), and MCO's structure (.66).
Cannibalizations per flight hour had significant correlations
with the CO's structure (-.71), the XO ' s structure (-.70),
and the MCO's structure (-.56). NORM had significant
correlations with the CO's LPC (-.67) and the XO ' s structure
(-.52). AWM % NORM had a significant correlation with the
XO's structure (-.56). Finally, IMMH had a significant
correlation with the MCO's LPC (-.65).
Perhaps more significant to naval aviation than the
variables that demonstrated significant relationships with
leadership style were the variables that did not have sig-
nificant correlations. OR, Operationally Ready, the primary
statistic used to evaluate squadron performance, and certainly
one of the most important to other variables --as evidenced by

the significant correlations it has with NORM (-.55), FSC
(.73), and factor 1, Aircraft Availability, (.90) did not have
any significant correlations with leadership style. The
highest non-significant correlations for OR appeared with CO
LPC (.58) and CO structure (-.64).
Additionally, DMMH and A799 demonstrated no significant
relationships with leadership style. These two statistics
have received considerable attention from maintenance
managers as statistics which indicate trends in manpower
utilization and maintenance procedures that were controllable
by the squadrons. The highest non-significant correlation
for DMMH and leadership style was for the MCO ' s LPC (-.53).
The highest non-significant correlation for A799 with leadership
style was for the MCPO's structure ^.57).
While it cannot be concluded from this data that leadership
has no significant relationship to OR, A799, and DMMH, it would
appear that leadership style has no direct relationship. Leader-
ship behavior may well be more influential on these statistics
than style, and continued emphasis on these facets of readiness
would indeed be appropriate.
Correlations of leadership style and the factors of
readiness indicated the same trend as correlations with the
individual variables of readiness. The most important leadership
styles were for the CO with significant correlations of the CO's
LPC (.77) and structure (-.70) with factor 1 Aircraft Availability
The XO had a single significant correlation (-.62) with factor 5,
Maintenance Procedures, and the MCO had a significant correlation
with Manpower Utilization, factor 3 (-.65).
69

The only decidedly significant result of leadership style
correlations with the factors of readiness was that the CO '
s
consideration score had no significant correlations with the
individual variables but demonstrated a significant correlation
(.71) with AWM % NORiM, NORM, and CANN when these variables
were grouped together as factor 5, Maintenance Procedures.
When step-wise multiple linear regression was employed to
examine the interactions of the various facets of leadership
style within the dual leadership teams with the individual
variables of readiness and the factors computed for readiness,
two important results were obtained.
First, the MCO-MCPO dual leadership team demonstrated no
significant correlations with either the variables or the
factors when acting simultaneously. From earlier results of
the MCO with the criterion variables, it would appear that the
MCO's leadership style had significant relationships with
readiness when acting alone but not when acting in tandom
with the MCPO. A partial explanation for the complete lack
of significant correlations for the MCPO ivith any possible
combination of other variables may lie in the great difference
between the MCPO's underlying need structures and their
perceived roles in the dimensions of consideration and structure.
The MCPO's as a group were one standard deviation above the
mean for the LPC , indicating a relatively high relationship
orientation, and yet were also significantly above the other
leaders in initiating structure. It may be that how the MCPO"s
felt they ought to behave and their actual demonstrated behavior
bears no correlation. In any event, it would be simply incredulous
TO

to conclude that the MCPO's leadersjiip has no significant
relationship to aircraft material readiness.
The second important result obtained with multiple
regression concerned the leader's consideration scores.
Previous results of bivariate correlation demonstrated no
relationships between the CD's or XO ' s consideration score and
either the individual variables of readiness or the factors
of readiness. When the variables of readiness were
considered with all aspects of the leadership styles of the
CO-XO dual leadership team, the CO's consideration score
appeared to contribute significantly to AWM % NORM
( 3 - 1.67) , RMCM ( 6 =-2.21) , FSC ( 6 =-.S8) , and DMMH ( 6 = 2.66) .
Additionally, the CO's consideration dimension was the most
important predictor variable for all of the above, except
FSC, where the CO's task-related dimension, CT, was the most
important (3 = -. 99). The XO ' s consideration dimension appeared
to have significant relationships as a predictor with AWM %
NORM ( 0=1.06), RMCM (6 = 2.33), and FSC (e =-.73).
These significant results with consideration are important
when it is recognized tfiat consideration has had a poor tracl:
n-'. orJ o \' CO r rcvl a t ing w i I !i concerctc criterion variables. Tlie
larger iinpl icat i on was tliat when consideration was considered
alone no significant correlations resulted. When consideration
was employed as a predictor variable in conjunction with the
task-related dimension significant correlations resulted. Con-
sideration has previously been relegated to providing relation-
ships with less concrete criterion "such as attitudes toward
supervisors, intradepartmental stress, supervisory recognition,
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and peer ratings. [Fleishman, 1969]. In this study
consideration was demonstrated to be a significantly valid
predictor of unit performance.
To generalize from these results, it cannot be stated
that when the socio- emotional and task-related roles were
separated and shared among the leaders of the dual leader-
ship teams, aircraft material readiness was improved. It may
be, that the combination of leadership styles are better
examined as predictors of aircraft material readiness when
all five readiness factors are allowed to interact simultaneously
Sample size severely restricted that possible analysis in this
study.
It can, however, be more firmly stated, based on the complete
lack of significant results for the MCO-MCPO team, that the
CO and XO have a more significant relationship with aircraft
material readiness than do the middle managers who actually
direct and perform the day to day operations which determine
the levels of readiness exhibited by the squadrons.
Another important result concerned one of the primary
variables in the Aircraft Availability factor, FSC , full systems
capable. FSC has been considered to be one of the most important
variables of both operational and combat readiness. This is
evidenced by the significant correlation between FSC and OR,
operationally ready, the variable most widely used to evaluate
squadron readiness, of (.73).
FSC has been for maintenance managers one of the most
difficult goals to acheive. Several other variables affect it,
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such as, NORS, NORM, RMCS, RMCM, and AVG A/C. In view of this,
the relationship between the CO ' s LPC and FSC becomes a very
important result.
An important result for leaders is that while very strong
relationships exist between individual variables of leadership
style and individual variables and factors of readiness, when
the variables are allowed to interact together, more significant
relationships are discovered. The implication is that single
aspects of readiness can be affected by individual variables
of leadership style, but to affect or optimize aircraft
material readiness in terms of all variables and all factors,
the CO-XO dual leadership team must allow each of the leadership
style dimensions to interact simultaneously without supressing
any one dimension.
Although no combination of leadership styles for the
four leaders in this study was identified as dominant in
being assocaited with high aircraft material readiness, several
combinations demonstrated the tradeoffs that 6xist between
factors^ of aircraft material readiness. A high rate of
Flight Operations appears to be attained when the CO
emphasizes initiating structure as a behavior and the XO
emphasizes consideration. High Flight Operations is traded
off against reduced Aircraft Availability with this combination
of leadership styles.
Similarly, low Manpower Utilization, an indicator of
good maintenance, can be attained by the CO ' s emphasizing
consideration and the XO ' s emphasizing initiating structure.
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The tradeoff for efficient Manpower Utilization appears
to be excessive AWM % NORM, NORM, and CANN grouped together
as Maintenance Procedures
.
These conflicting results demonstrate the complex nature
of aircraft material readiness but do not lead to any general
conclusions about the best combination of leadership style for
maintaining a high rate of aircraft material readiness.
Other tradeoffs between the factors of aircraft material
readiness for combinations of leadership style within the dual
leadership teams may exist, but were not discovered by this
study due to limited sample size. All possible combinations
of leadership style were not represented, possibly accounting
for the lack of results with other factors.
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Readiness, in peace time, is the single most stressed
criterion of unit performance in the Navy. Maintaining
a high level of readiness whether operational, equipment,
personnel, or material readiness becomes, therefore, a major
priority for the individual unit.
Although many exogenous variables affect the level of
readiness exhibited by the indivdual commands, such as
personnel manning, enlisted rate structures, age of equipment,
and logistics support leadership has been the variable looked
to, to prcv/'ide the high level of readiness needed to protect
this nations 's valuable asset, "sea power".
The direct link between readiness and leadership has never
been crystal clear. The purpose of this study was to
demonstrate that there exists a direct link, measure it, and
recommend actions wliich would improve the relationship. The
direct link hypothesized between readiness and leadership
was leadership style.
This study has demonstrated that by grouping the commonly
collected and assessed variables of readiness in naval aviation
into factors which represent readiness more fully than in the
traditional sense of simply operational readiness, leadership
style has sever significant relationships with the factors of
unit effectiveness in maintaining aircraft material readiness.
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The Light Attack Community of naval aviation, the focus
of this study, has, largely as a result of the complexity of
the A7E aircraft, been extraordinarily tasked with demonstrating
exceptional leadership in order to maintain a high level of
readiness. Frequent changes in mission, sophisticated equipment,
and a reduced priority for funding logistics support
requirements have severely challenged leaders in the community.
Leadership has been necessarily dynamic in maintaining a
high level of aircraft material readiness.
It was an important result that the leadership style, not
intended leadership behavior, was measured and shown to be
a predictor. Leadership style is less dependent upon the
situation than is behavior, but is not as easily traced from
the leader to the criterion of readiness. Leadership style,
or the emphasis that leaders place on the task or on
relationships with co-workers and subordinates, is translated
into behaviors which allow the leader to accomplish the mission
through the group. In this study the mission was high aircraft
material readiness. Predicting what leader behaviors would
optimize aircraft material readiness would not only require
a formula for every situation but would also be impossible
for leaders to carry out on a daily basis. Leadership style,
on the other hand, is very concise and clean as simply the
emphasis that leaders place on supervisory - subordinate
relationships. Although no general "best case" was discovered
for what emphasis the leaders should place on the tasks or
relationships with the group, several important relationships
were discovered between emphasis on the dimensions of leader-
ship style and individual factors of aircraft material readiness.
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Another important result was that although the leaders'
style did not have significant relationships with individual
variables within the factors labelled Maintenance Procedures
and Flight Operations, the leaders' styles were shown to
have significant relationships with the factor themselves.
Emphasis on individual statistics, or variables of readiness,
may not have the desired effect of improving aircraft material
readiness in the broad context, whereas emphasis on the
factors may.
Although this study did not produce enough significant
results to identify a combination of leadership styles
that would improve overall aircraft material readiness,
several relationships indicated general conditions for
optimizing individual factors.
Aircraft Availability, the most important factor if one
had to be picked, was associated with the Commanding Officer.
This factor tended to be high when the CO placed more emphasis
on the socio-emotional climate of the command rather than on
the task.
Manpower Utilization tended to be low when the Maintenance
Control Officer placed more emphasis on the task than on the
socio-emotional climate of the maintenance department.
Excessive Maintenance Procedures tended to be low when the
Executive Officer placed more emphasis on directing group
activities through planning, communicating information, scheduling,
criticizing, and trying out new ideas. Additionally, excessive
Maintenance Procedures tended to be low when the Commanding
Officer was more impersonal in his relations with others.
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Mission Capability was not found to have any significant
relationships with leadership style.
It must be stressed that these relationships, which were
associated with high aircraft material readiness, may involve
tradeoffs with other factors. The situation where the CO
emphasizes the socio-emotional dimension, which is associated
with high Aircraft Availability, is also associated with
excessive Maintenance Procedures. Excessive Maintenance
Procedures would be the case where AWM% NORM, NORM, and CANN
rates were high indicative of a less than desirable situation,
in the long run.
The tradeoff for high Flight Operations appeared to be
reduced Aircraft Availability. The tradeoff for more
efficient Manpower Utilization appeared to be increased use
of excessive Maintenance Procedures.
Over interpretation of the results must be warned against
because of the small sample size. It is hoped that this
study can be expanded into Heavy Attack and Fighter communities
The same criterion data of readiness is collected in these other
communities of naval aviation and the same leader positions
are employed to direct the readiness effort.
Because of the practice of "fleeting up" of Executive
Officers to Commanding Officers, unique to the aviation
community, it is suggested that this study should be first
in a longitudinal study to take place over several years.
This kind of study would make it possible to examine further






1. AVG NO. RPTG ACFT . - Average number of reporting aircraft:
the number of hours that aircraft are reported in a readiness
reportable status, (RRS) , divided by the total number of
hours in the reporting period.
2. TOT % NORS - Total percentage not-operationally ready, due
to supply: The number of not-operationally ready hours
due to supply, divided by the number of hours that aircraft
are reported in an RRS status.
3. TOT % NORiM - Total percentage not-operationally ready
due to maintenance: The number of not-operationally ready
hours due to scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, divided
by the numbers of hours that aircraft are reported in an
RRS status.
4. UNSCH ^ NORM - Percentage not-operationally ready due to
unscheduled maintenance: The number of not-operationally
ready hours due to unscheduled maintenance, divided by the
number of hours that aircraft are reported in an RRS
status
.
5. AWM % OF TOT NORM - Awaiting maintenance percentage of
total not-operationally ready due to maintenance: The
number of awaiting maintenance hours, divided by the
total number of hours aircraft are reported as not-operationally
ready due to scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.
6. ACT ^ OR - Actual percent readiness achieved: The number of hours
aircraft are reported in an RRS status, less the not-operationally
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ready hours due to supply, scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance, divided by the total hours aircraft are
reported in an RRS ctatus.
7. TOT % RMC-NFE - Total percentage of reduced material
condition due to not fully equipped: The number of
reduced material condition hours due to not befng fully
equipped because of supply, divided by the number of hours
aircraft are reported in an RRS status.
8. TOT % RMCM - Total percentage of reduced mission capability
due to maintenance: The number of reduced mission capable
hours due to scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, divided
by the number of hours aircraft are reported in an RRS
status
.
9. TOT % UNSCH RMCM - Total percentage reduced mission
capability due to unscheduled maintenance: The number
of reduced mission capable hours due to unscheduled
maintenance, divided by the number of hours aircraft
are reported in an RRS status.
10. TOT % RSC - Total percentage full systems capable: The
number of hours aircraft are reported in an RRS status
less the not operationally ready hours due to supply,
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, less the reduced
'. material condition hours due to not fully equipped because
of supply, scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, divided




11. AVG FIT UTL/ACFT - Average flight utilization per
aircraft: The number of flight hours, divided by the
average number of reporting aircraft.
12. AVG FLT/ACFT - Average flights per aircraft: The number
of flights, divided by the average number of reporting
aircraft
.
13. ACT DMMH/FH - Actual direct maintenance man-hours per
flight hour: The number of man-hours reported, divided
by the number of flight hours.
14. IMA DMMH/FH - Intermediate direct maintenance man-hours
per flight hour: The number of man-hours as reported by
other than organizational level activities, divided by
the number of flight hours.
15. CANN - Cannibalizations per flight hour: The number of
cannibalization actions taken per month, divided by the
number of flight hours for that month.
16. A799 - No-Defect rate: The number of parts inducted
into the intermediate level maintenance activity, (IMA)
per month, which contained no defect, divided by the





FLEISHMAN'S LEADERSHIP OPINION QUESTIOmMPvii
1. Put the welfare of your unit above the welfare of any
person in it.
2. Give in to your subordinates indiscussion with them.
3. Enc&urage after-duty work by persons of your unit.
4. Try out your own new ideas in the unit.
5. Back up what persons under you do.
6. Criticize poor work.
7. Ask for more than the persons under you can accomplish.
8. Refuse to compromise a point.
9. Insist that persons under you follow to the letter those
standard routines handed down to you.
10. Help persons under you with their personal problems.
11. Be slow to adopt new ideas.
12. Get the approval of persons under you on important matters
before going ahead.
13. Resist changes in ways of doing things.
14. Assign persons under you to particular tasks.
15. Speak in a manner not to be questioned.
16. Stress importance of being ahead of other units.
17. Criticize a specific act rather than a particular member
of you unit.
18. Let the persons under you do their work the way they think
is best.
.19. Do personal favors for persons under you.
20. Emphasis meeting of deadlines.
21. Insist that you be informed on decisions made by persons
under you.
22. Offer new approaches- to problems.
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23. Treat all persons under you as your equal.
24. Be willing to make changes.
25. Talk about how much should be done.
26. Wait for persons in your unit to push new ideas.
27. Rule with an iron hand.
28. Reject suggestions for changes.
29. Change the duties of persons under you without first
talking it over with them.
30. Decide in detail what shall be done and how it shall be
done by the persons under you.
31. See to it that persons under you are working up to capacity
32. Stand up for persons under you, even though it makes you
unpopular with others.
33. Put suggestions made by persons in the unit into operation.
34. Refuse to explain your actions.
35. Ask for sacrifices from persons under you for the good of
your entire unit.
36. Act without consulting persons under you.
37. "Needle" persons under you for greater effort.
38. Insist that everything be done your way.
39. Encourage slow-working persons in your unit to work harder.





FIEDLER'S LEAST PREFERRED CO-WORKER QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions: Describe the person with whom you can work
least well
:
1. Pleasant : 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Unpleasant








4. Helpful : 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 : Not Helpful
5. Unenthu-
siastic : 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Enthusiastic
6. Lots of
fun : 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Serious
7. Nervous : 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 : Relaxed
8. Hard to
get to


















it : 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
He would
criticize
: you a lot
12. Boring : 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 : Interesing
13. Likes to


















unhappy :8 7654 321: Cheerful
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